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 The author reviews the recent case of 
Birch v. Union of Taxation Employees, Local 
70030, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal 
evaluated—in terms of the doctrine of uncon-
scionability—the enforceability of a clause fin-
ing union members who cross picket lines dur-
ing legal strikes. He applauds the decision as an 
important step toward jettisoning the tradi-
tional common law penalty doctrine, according 
to which stipulated remedy clauses designed to 
have an in terrorem effect upon a contracting 
party are per se unenforceable. The author 
criticizes the decision, however, for its failure to 
examine features of the case that would have 
been ignored under the penalty doctrine but 
that should have been prominent under the un-
conscionability doctrine. These features include: 
other provisions of the contract, the relative dif-
ficulty of arriving at “a genuine pre-estimate of 
the loss” as opposed to a “reasonable penalty”, 
and the process by which the contract was 
formed. The author concludes that, in failing to 
examine these features, the court missed an op-
portunity to clarify the changing law on the en-
forceability of stipulated remedy clauses. 
L’auteur analyse l’arrêt Birch v. Union of 
Taxation Employees, Local 70030 dans lequel la 
Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a évalué sous l’angle 
de la théorie de l’iniquité la validité d’une clause 
imposant une amende aux membres d’un 
syndicat qui traversent la ligne de piquetage 
lors d’une grève légale. L’auteur approuve la 
décision de la cour, qu’il considère comme un 
pas significatif vers la possibilité de se défaire 
de la doctrine traditionnelle des clauses pénales 
de la common law selon laquelle les clauses 
destinées à avoir un effet in terrorem sur une 
des parties au contrat étaient réputées 
impossibles à exécuter. L’auteur critique 
néanmoins le jugement pour avoir ignoré 
certains aspects de la situation ; des éléments 
auxquels la doctrine traditionnelle des clauses 
pénales ne s’intéresse pas, mais qui, du point de 
vue de l’auteur, auraient dû être examinés sous 
l’angle de la théorie de l’iniquité. Parmi ces 
éléments, l’auteur soutient que la cour aurait 
dû se pencher sur les autres clauses du contrat, 
sur la difficulté d’évaluer les coûts anticipés de 
la réparation du préjudice et sur le processus de 
formation du contrat. L’auteur conclut que, 
parce que la cour n’a pas examiné ces éléments, 
elle a manqué une occasion de faire évoluer la 
common law dans le domaine de la mise en 
œuvre des clauses pénales. 
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Introduction 
 Do advances in legal doctrine matter? Will it make a difference if 
courts begin to analyze a particular legal problem under the rubric of one 
doctrine rather than another? In theory, new doctrinal lenses should 
bring different features of the problem into focus, and this should in turn 
lead judges to form different impressions of how the problem ought to be 
resolved. The Ontario Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Birch v. Union 
of Taxation Employees, Local 70030 casts doubt on this hypothesis.1 The 
majority’s decision in the case suggests that changing the doctrine used to 
analyze the enforceability of stipulated remedies will not necessarily af-
fect the outcomes of future cases. Changing outcomes may require a  more 
fundamental shift in judges’ understandings of stipulated remedies and 
their role in contractual relationships.  
 Birch was preceded by a path-breaking line of cases in which Cana-
dian appellate courts signalled their willingness to depart from the strict 
common law rule against enforcing a stipulated remedy that amounts to a 
penalty rather than a genuine pre-estimate of damages.2 Those cases 
marked a positive development in Canadian contract law, as adherence to 
the traditional rule against penalty clauses is difficult to justify. This is 
not to say that all penalty clauses ought to be enforced. But some of them 
should be enforced, while the reasons not to enforce the rest are more or 
less the same as the reasons not to enforce other contractual provisions. 
Consequently, doctrines such as unconscionability, mistake, and contra 
proferentem ought to be capable of addressing concerns relevant to the en-
forceability of stipulated remedies. There is no need for a rule that singles 
out penalty clauses for special treatment. Prominent commentators have 
                                                  
1   2008 ONCA 809, 93 O.R. (3d) 1, 305 D.L.R. (4th) 64 [Birch], leave to appeal to S.C.C. re-
fused, 32989 (7 May 2009). 
2   See especially Liu v. Coal Harbour Properties Partnership, 2006 BCCA 385, 273 D.L.R. 
(4th) 508 at para. 24, 56 B.C.L.R. (4th) 230 [Coal Harbour] (the decision to grant relief 
against a penalty depends on whether to enforce the penalty would be unconscionable); 
Peachtree II Associates—Dallas L.P. v. 857486 Ontario Ltd. (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 362, 
(sub nom. 869163 Ontario Ltd. v. Torrey Springs II Associates Ltd. Partnership) 256 
D.L.R. (4th) 490 (C.A.) [Peachtree II cited to O.R.] (“I agree with Professor Waddams’ 
observation in The Law of Damages that as there is often little to distinguish between 
[penalties and forfeitures] and that there is much to be said for assimilating both under 
unconscionability. The effect of assimilation would be ‘to provide a more rational 
framework for the decisions of both forfeitures and penalties’” at para. 32 [reference 
omitted]), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 31126 (19 January 2006); Elsley Estate v. 
J.G. Collins Insurance Agencies Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 916, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (“It is now 
evident that the power to strike down a penalty clause is a blatant interference with 
freedom of contract and is designed for the sole purpose of providing relief against op-
pression for the party having to pay the stipulated sum. It has no place where there is 
no oppression” S.C.R. at 937). It is important to note that all but the first of these cases 
dealt with this issue in obiter dicta. 
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long endorsed this position,3 and Canadian courts and legislatures are 
cautiously beginning to take heed.4 This question remains: will analyzing 
stipulated remedies through the lens of unconscionability rather than the 
penalty doctrine make any difference in the outcome of decided cases? 
I. The Decision in Birch 
 Most reported disputes concerning stipulated remedies arise in com-
mercial settings. The dispute in Birch is an exception. According to the 
agreed facts, the applicants were employees of the Canada Revenue 
Agency and members of the Union of Taxation Employees (UTE), a com-
ponent of the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC). UTE brought dis-
ciplinary proceedings against the applicants for violating the PSAC con-
stitution by crossing a picket line to work during a legal strike by PSAC. 
The PSAC constitution provides that the punishment for this sort of of-
fense 
shall include the imposition of a fine that equals the amount of daily 
remuneration earned by the member, multiplied by the number of 
days that the member crossed the picket line, performed work for 
the employer or voluntarily performed struck work.5  
 Pursuant to this and other provisions of the constitution, the union 
suspended the applicants for three years (one year for each day that they 
crossed the picket line) and fined them each an amount equivalent to 
their gross salary for the three days they crossed the picket line. The ap-
                                                  
3   See S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 5th ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2005) at 
320-32. For a historical overview and explanation of the development of the penalty 
doctrine, and suggested alternative legal principles, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. 
Scott, “Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some 
Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach” (1977) 77 Colum. L. 
Rev. 554. 
4   New Brunswick has enacted legislation that was intended to reform the common law 
rule against enforcement of penalty clauses. See Law Reform Act, S.N.B. 1993, c. L-1.2 
(“A party to a contract may enforce a penalty clause or a liquidated damages clause to 
the extent that it is reasonable in all of the circumstances that the clause should be en-
forced” at s. 5(1)); Mortgage Makers v. McKeen, 2009 NBCA 61, 312 D.L.R. (4th) 82 
(“s. 5(1) of the Act effects a fundamental change in the common law regarding the en-
forceability of penalty and liquidated damages clauses” at para. 3), rev’g 2008 NBQB 
327, 339 N.B.R. (2d) 215. See also Timothy Rattenbury, “Reforming (or Should That be 
Re-forming?) the Common Law: Some Notes on the Law Reform Act” (l994) 11:1 Solici-
tor’s Journal (N.B.) 8. I am grateful to Edward Veitch for bringing this body of law to 
my attention. 
5   Birch, supra note 1 at paras. 38-39, 64-65, 75 (citing the PSAC Constitution, s. 25(3)). 
See also Berry v. Pulley, 2002 SCC 40, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 493, 221 D.L.R. (4th) 651 [Berry] 
(holding that the relationship between a union and its members is contractual in na-
ture). 
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plicants refused to pay the fine and the union sought to enforce its rights 
in the Small Claims Division of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The 
applicants applied for a declaration that the fines were unenforceable. 
The application judge declared that the clause was not only a penalty 
clause but also unconscionable, and thus unenforceable on both counts.6 
He went on to conclude that in the absence of legislation, no such fine 
could be enforced.7 At the Ontario Court of Appeal, Justice Armstrong 
dismissed the union’s appeal from the decision of the application judge, 
with Justice Rouleau concurring. Justice Juriansz dissented. 
 Birch may be regarded as a noteworthy case in the development of 
Ontario labour law on account of its impact on the balance of power be-
tween both unions and their members, and unions and employers. It may 
also be of more general importance. The Ontario Court of Appeal prem-
ised its decision on the notion that the relationship between the appli-
cants and their union was governed by principles of contract law and that 
no special statutory provisions were applicable to the case at hand.8 Con-
sequently—if it is taken at face value—the decision in Birch has signifi-
cant ramifications for the development of contract law in Ontario, and 
perhaps elsewhere too. 
 Birch is a noteworthy case in the law of contracts because it repre-
sents an important step toward jettisoning the penalty doctrine. At first 
glance, the significance of the decision may not be immediately obvious. 
The court declined to rule on either the application of the penalty doctrine 
to the particular facts of the case or whether the general rule against pen-
alty clauses should be abolished. Both the majority and the minority ex-
plicitly endorsed the abolition of the strict rule against enforcing penalty 
clauses, but only in the context of union constitutions.9 What is, however, 
                                                  
6   See Birch v. Union of Taxation Employees, Local 70030 (2007), 288 D.L.R. (4th) 424 at 
para. 60 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
7   See ibid. 
8   See Birch, supra note 1 at para. 14. See also Berry, supra note 5 at para. 48 (establish-
ing ordinary principles of contract law). 
9   See Birch, supra note 1. Armstrong J.A. held, “While I agree with the view that a union 
constitution represents a different kind of contract between a union and its members 
and that a penalty clause is not necessarily unenforceable in accordance with the com-
mon-law rule, I see no reason to suggest that the law of unconscionability does not ap-
ply to these kinds of agreements” (ibid. at para. 38). However, he prefaced those re-
marks by writing, “Whatever may be said of the facts of this case, it is not a typical 
commercial case and I would not wish to be taken as suggesting that what follows is in-
tended to be general authority for sounding the death knell for the rule against penalty 
clauses” (ibid. at para. 37). Juriansz J.A. held, “While, like Armstrong J.A., I would de-
cline to make a sweeping pronouncement that the rule against penalty clauses is no 
longer applicable to the law of contract generally, I would conclude the common-law 
rule against penalty clauses does not apply to a union constitution” (ibid. at para. 100).  
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more significant about Birch is that when confronted with a challenge to 
the enforceability of a stipulated remedy, all of the members of the court 
expressly endorsed the idea that the problem could be analyzed using the 
doctrine of unconscionability. In doing so they bolstered the respectability 
of an approach that had previously been adopted only in obiter dicta and 
secondary literature.10 By making a serious effort to map out how the en-
forceability of stipulated remedies might be analyzed under the rubric of 
unconscionability, the members of the Ontario Court of Appeal probably 
did a great deal to make other judges comfortable with the new ap-
proach—the first step toward convincing them to abandon the penalty 
doctrine.  
 Another encouraging feature of the decision is the fact that both the 
majority and the minority agreed on the basic contours of the unconscion-
ability doctrine. Justice Armstrong approved of the decision’s holding that 
“a determination of unconscionability involves a two-part analysis—a 
finding of inequality of bargaining power and a finding that the terms of 
an agreement have a high degree of unfairness.”11 Justice Juriansz agreed 
with Justice Armstrong’s review and formulation of the test for uncon-
scionability, but emphasized that the unfairness must stem from an ine-
quality of bargaining power.12 The majority and the minority also 
agreed—perhaps too hastily (more on this below)—that this particular 
contract was characterized by an inequality of bargaining power, noting 
that when it was formed the applicants were unable “to negotiate or 
change its terms.”13 Unfortunately, the court did not resolve the perennial 
question of whether unfairness is to be assessed by reference to circum-
stances at the time the stipulated remedy is invoked (the approach 
adopted in equity when determining whether it would be unconscionable 
to deny relief from forfeiture), or the circumstances prevailing when the 
parties entered the contract.14 Nonetheless, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
                                                  
10   See supra note 3. Compare Telecommunications Workers Union Local 2002 v. Macmil-
lan, 2008 ABQB 657, 458 A.R. 367 at paras. 35-40, 97 Alta. L.R. (4th) 393, leave to ap-
peal to S.C.C. refused, 32940 (7 May 2009). Here, in contrast to Birch, the Alberta Court 
of Queen’s Bench upheld a lower court’s refusal to enforce a union’s fine primarily on 
the grounds that it was a penalty rather than a genuine pre-estimate of compensatory 
damages. In this case, however, unlike in Birch, the union’s constitution left the fine’s 
quantum to be determined by the trial board rather than specifying either the amount 
of the fine, or a formula for its calculation (ibid. at para. 6). 
11   Birch, supra note 1 at para. 45. 
12   Ibid. at para. 79. 
13   Ibid. at paras. 50, Armstrong J.A., 81, Juriansz J.A. 
14   See Peachtree II, supra note 2 at para. 25; Dimensional Investments Ltd. v. Canada 
(1967), [1968] S.C.R. 93 at 100-101, 64 D.L.R. (2d) 632 [Dimensional]. For an overview 
of the debate from an Anglo-Canadian perspective, see Waddams, supra note 3 at 388. 
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consensus on the basic test for unconscionability should help allay con-
cerns that unconscionability offers too vague or indeterminate a standard 
to replace the bright-line rule embodied in the penalty doctrine.  
 So where did the majority and the minority part ways? Essentially, 
they disagreed about the significance of two factors bearing on the unfair-
ness of the penalty clause. First, they disagreed about the significance of 
the fact that the applicants could have avoided the fines by resigning from 
the union before crossing the picket line. If the applicants had resigned 
they would not have sacrificed any of the employment benefits enjoyed by 
other members of the bargaining unit, but they would have lost the ability 
to participate in union governance. For Justice Juriansz, this meant that 
the liability found unconscionable by the application judge stemmed from 
the applicants’ decision not to resign from the union rather than from any 
lack of bargaining power.15 Meanwhile, the majority believed that the 
presence of the option to resign was irrelevant to the analysis of whether 
the penalty clause was unconscionable: “The penalty clause in the union 
constitution is either unconscionable or it is not.”16 They rejected the view 
that a fine that would otherwise be clearly unconscionable could be saved 
by giving union members the option to resign before crossing a picket 
line.17 
 A second point of disagreement stemmed from the fact that Justice 
Juriansz was not convinced that a fine equal to the applicants’ gross pay 
was necessarily disproportionate to the damage suffered by the union as a 
consequence of the breach. He acknowledged that the damage suffered by 
the union was difficult to estimate, but rejected the conclusion that the 
task was impossible. He accepted that the applicants harmed the union by 
“diminishing its strength in its economic struggle with the employer.”18 
He also accepted that “[t]he amount by which the union’s strength has 
been diminished is equal to the quantity of labour provided to the em-
ployer,” and that “[t]he best measure of the labour provided to the em-
ployer is the amount that the employer paid for it.”19 Consequently, he 
concluded that a fine equal to the applicants’ gross pay was “a reasonable, 
      
The lack of consensus in American law is reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1995)) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (§ 356(1) (1981) 
[Restatement]), which state that damages must be reasonable in light of the “antici-
pated or actual” loss caused by the breach. This topic is beyond the scope of this com-
ment. 
15   Birch, supra note 1 at para. 86. 
16   Ibid. at para. 61. 
17   Ibid. 
18   Ibid. at para. 94. 
19   Ibid. 
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if not a particularly apt” pre-estimate of the union’s damages from the 
breach.20 Justice Armstrong dismissed this argument summarily on the 
grounds that no evidence had been adduced—“not a scintilla”—of any 
damage to the union or its members.21 
II. Missed Opportunities 
 The majority’s opinion fails to realize the potential benefits of using 
the doctrine of unconscionability rather than the penalty doctrine as the 
lens through which courts can analyze the enforceability of stipulated 
remedies. The majority could have used the new lens to examine features 
of the case that would have been overlooked in an analysis conducted ex-
clusively through the penalty doctrine. Instead, it dismissed those fea-
tures as irrelevant to its analysis. The dissent picked up on some but not 
all of the missing points. 
 Which features of the case were neglected? To begin with, a central 
problem with penalty doctrine, at least in its traditional form, is that it 
determines the enforceability of stipulated damages clauses without ref-
erence to other terms of the contract. For instance, it ignores the possibil-
ity that the prejudicial impact of a penalty clause on a breaching party 
has been offset by a benefit such as a price reduction conferred by another 
term of the contract.22 By contrast, a determination of unconscionability 
typically entails an examination of all the terms of the contract.23 The 
ability to undertake a holistic analysis of the problem is a key advantage 
                                                  
20   Ibid. at para. 95. 
21   Ibid. at para. 63. 
22   See e.g. Ringrow Pty Ltd. v. BP Australia Pty Ltd., [2005] HCA 71, 224 C.L.R. 656 at 
paras. 37-38 (confirming that the penalty doctrine may be applicable even when a 
clause that would otherwise amount to a penalty has been offset by a reduction in the 
purchase price). For a much less traditional approach to the penalty doctrine, see 
Murray v. Leisureplay Plc, [2005] EWCA Civ 963, [2005] IRLR 946 at paras. 54, 71-76 
[Murray] (permitting a stipulated remedy to be enforced even though it exceeded a 
genuine pre-estimate of the damages in part because other terms of the contract con-
ferred benefits on the breaching party). For a discussion of why parties may agree to 
pay penalties in exchange for concessions on other terms of a contract, see Robert E. 
Scott & George G. Triantis, “Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in 
Contract Law” (2004) 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1428. 
23   See e.g. Fraser Jewellers (1982) Ltd. v. Dominion Electric Protection Co. (1997), 34 O.R. 
(3d) 1, 148 D.L.R. (4th) 496 (relief from an exclusionary clause should be granted only if 
the clause is unconscionable seen “in light of the entire agreement” O.R. at 10); Harry v. 
Kreutziger (1978), 95 D.L.R. (3d) 231, 9 B.C.L.R. 16 (C.A.) (Lambert J.A. holding: “[the] 
single question is whether the transaction, seen as a whole, is sufficiently divergent 
from community standards of commercial morality that it should be rescinded” D.L.R. 
at 241). 
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of using the unconscionability doctrine instead of the penalty doctrine to 
determine the enforceability of stipulated remedies. 
 In the present case, a holistic analysis of the enforceability of the 
stipulated remedy issue would have involved considering its interaction 
with the provisions governing members’ rights to resign. The contract es-
sentially gave the applicants the right to elect between two potential sanc-
tions for strike breaking: being excluded from the benefits of union mem-
bership, or paying the prescribed fine. It thus seems artificial to deter-
mine whether they were the victims of abuse without considering the sub-
stance of their options. Such an evaluation would not predetermine the 
outcome of the analysis. As Justice Armstrong noted in passing, being ex-
cluded from the benefits of union membership “is a significant penalty in 
itself.”24 If the court concluded that forced resignation from the union 
would have been an unconscionable penalty for breach, then the presence 
of an option to resign could not buttress the case for enforcing the provi-
sion calling for a fine. Therefore, my complaint here is not that the major-
ity in the Ontario Court of Appeal or the court below reached the wrong 
conclusion on the facts of the case. Instead, my concern is about the rea-
sons offered in support of that conclusion. By dismissing the option to re-
sign as irrelevant to the unfairness branch of its unconscionability analy-
sis, the majority perpetuated the unduly narrow analytical frame that is 
one of the most problematic features of the penalty doctrine. 
 The second point of disagreement between the majority and minority 
also reflects the majority’s exceptionally narrow conception of the factors 
relevant to the enforceability of a stipulated remedy. A common complaint 
about the penalty doctrine is that, at least in its stricter forms, it ignores 
some of the benign reasons why parties adopt stipulated remedies that 
provide for damages higher than the losses that can be proved at trial.25 
For instance, in some cases, damages suffered as a result of breach of con-
tract are virtually impossible to prove. This supports the conclusion that 
it is reasonable to enforce stipulated remedies adopted in circumstances 
where actual losses are likely to be difficult to prove, so long as they qual-
ify as a genuine pre-estimate of damages.26 On this view, difficulty of prov-
ing actual loss ought to be treated as a factor that weighs in favour of en-
forcing a stipulated remedy that otherwise appears to operate as a pen-
                                                  
24   Birch, supra note 1 at para. 57. 
25   See generally Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, “Optimal Penalties in Contracts” (2003) 
78 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 33. 
26   See Coal Harbour, supra note 2 at para. 10.  
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alty.27 In H.F. Clarke Ltd. v. Thermidaire Corp. Ltd., however, the Su-
preme Court of Canada adopted a strict version of the penalty doctrine 
and refused to treat the difficulty of proving actual losses as a factor 
pointing toward the conclusion that the stipulated damages clause in 
question was enforceable.28 Operating under the rubric of the doctrine of 
unconscionability, the court in Birch had an opportunity to take a differ-
ent view. Instead, the majority opinion left the impression that, on ac-
count of the potentially significant impact of the fine on the applicants, 
the onus was upon the union to show that the fine was proportional to the 
union’s actual damages. The court thus construed the doctrine of uncon-
scionability as no more open to arguments based on difficulty of proving 
loss than the strictest version of the rule against penalty clauses.  
 The minority unhelpfully tried to deny or at least downplay the diffi-
culty of determining the union’s losses resulting from the breach. Justice 
Juriansz seemed satisfied that the union had met the burden of showing 
that the fine was proportional to its actual losses, but the arguments he 
endorsed are weak. It is eminently plausible that breaking a strike would 
cause damage to the interests of a union and its members by altering the 
relative bargaining power of the union and the employer during a strike, 
and ultimately reducing the tangible benefits the union can secure 
through collective negotiations. However, Justice Juriansz’s suggestion 
that the magnitude of the effect on relative bargaining power would be 
“equal to the quantity of labour provided to the employer” entails an inde-
fensible leap of logic.29 By crossing the picket line, strike breakers benefit 
the employer to the extent that they are less costly or more skilled than 
replacement workers. Strike breakers enhance employer’s bargaining 
power by reducing the cost of the strike. In addition, to the extent that 
strike breaking reduces union solidarity, it may reduce the anticipated 
length of the strike, which simultaneously reduces the employer’s willing-
ness to bargain, and increases the union’s willingness to do the same. It 
seems reasonable to presume that the magnitude of these effects will be 
significant. Yet there is no evident reason to presume that the damage 
will correspond even roughly to the quantity of labour supplied to the em-
ployer. The more defensible conclusion is that none of these potential 
losses are amenable to calculation or proof at trial. 
 By ignoring or denying the difficulty of calculating and proving com-
pensatory damages, both the majority and the minority missed an oppor-
                                                  
27   See Dimensional, supra note 14 at 100; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co., Ltd. v. New Garage 
and Motor Co., Ltd., [1915] A.C. 79 at 87-88, [1914-1915] All E.R. Rep. 739 (H.L.) 
[Dunlop]. See also Restatement, supra note 14. 
28   (1974), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 319 at 338-39, 3 N.R. 133 [H.F. Clarke]. 
29   Birch, supra note 1 at para. 94. 
                                                                  COMMENT: BIRCH V. UNION OF TAXATION EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 70030   161 
 
 
tunity to explore whether, in the presence of these factors, a system of 
contract law freed of the strictures of the penalty doctrine can justify en-
forcing stipulated remedies on the ground that they are reasonable penal-
ties rather than genuine pre-estimates of compensatory damages. Such an 
approach would be consistent with the civil law’s treatment of penalty 
clauses under article 1623 of the Civil Code of Quebec.30 The union does 
not appear to have adopted this argument. But it could well have argued 
that when breach is likely to cause significant but incalculable losses, a 
party should be permitted to stipulate damages expressly designed to de-
ter rather than compensate for breach.31 Only the most liberal articula-
tions of the traditional penalty doctrine go that far.32  
 I do not mean to suggest that this would necessarily have been a win-
ning argument for the union. One would think that a fine equal to the ap-
plicants’ net pay would be a sufficient deterrent (and in fact, the clause 
could easily be construed to refer to net rather than gross pay). The ques-
tion of whether the union could have been required to seek injunctive re-
lief against the applicants also remains open. It is conceivable, however, 
that the union could have shown that injunctive relief was inappropriate 
or unavailable. The imposition of a fine equal to gross pay might then 
have been defended on the theory that it was necessary to deprive the ap-
plicants of the time value of money, or that the difference between net pay 
and gross pay for each employee would have been too difficult to calculate.  
 Another criticism of the penalty doctrine is that it treats as irrelevant 
the process by which a contract that contains a stipulated remedy has 
been formed. The traditional rule dictates that a penalty clause is unen-
forceable per se, regardless of the sophistication of the parties to the con-
tract (or lack thereof), the alternatives they faced, or how much time they 
spent negotiating the clause.33 One of the attractions of employing the un-
                                                  
30   See also Aristides N. Hatzis, “Having the Cake and Eating It Too: Effi-
cient Penalty Clauses in Common and Civil Contract Law” (2002) 22 Int’l Rev. L. & 
Econ. 381. 
31   For a narrower formulation of this argument, see Gregory Klass, “Contracting for Coop-
eration in Recovery” (2007) 117 Yale L.J. 2. 
32   See Murray, supra note 22 at paras. 54, 69-76 (permitting a stipulated remedy to be en-
forced even if it provides for an amount that exceeds a genuine pre-estimate of the 
damages if the discrepancy is justified for some other reason). Cf. Dunlop, supra note 
27.  
33   See e.g. H.F. Clarke, supra note 28 at 330 (penalty doctrine applies even to contracts be-
tween businessmen or business corporations with relatively equal bargaining power). 
See also Imperial Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Parsley, [1936] 2 All E.R. 515 (C.A.) (inequality of 
bargaining power is irrelevant to the analysis of whether the clause was a penalty 
clause); John Carter & Elisabeth Peden, “A Good Faith Perspective on Liquidated 
Damages” (2007) 23 J. Cont. L. 157 at 162. 
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conscionability doctrine in this context is that it explicitly calls for analy-
sis of the procedural as well as the substantive elements of the contract.34 
 Unfortunately, the majority in Birch paid scant attention to the proc-
ess by which the contract between the union and the applicants was 
formed. In concluding that the process involved inequality of bargaining 
power, it focused exclusively on the fact that the terms were not negotia-
ble before the applicants joined the union. They appear to have been led 
in this direction by a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in which 
Justice Iacobucci characterized a member who was unable to bargain over 
the terms of his contract with the union as having “no bargaining 
power”.35  
 The fact that the process by which a contract was formed did not in-
volve an opportunity to negotiate its terms—in other words, that it is a 
contract of adhesion—is neither sufficient nor necessary to justify special 
scrutiny of the contract’s substance.36 In principle, unconscionability doc-
trine should enable an evaluation of the contract’s terms that incorporates 
factors relevant to its formation. 
 The majority failed to realize this principle in several respects. To be-
gin with, the presence of viable alternatives to the signing of a contract 
can offset the effects of an inability to negotiate. Those alternatives might 
involve contracting with a competitor (e.g., the price of dry cleaning may 
not be negotiable, but in a city where there is a dry cleaner on every cor-
ner it seems wrong to conclude that customers suffer from inequality of 
bargaining power).37 When it comes to contracts between unions and pro-
spective members, contracting with a competing union is not a viable al-
ternative for the workers. But, at least according to Justice Juriansz, not 
contracting with any union at all may have been a viable alternative. This 
in turn raises the argument that the need to attract members would 
automatically induce unions to offer reasonable terms of membership, 
even without any explicit negotiation. Justice Juriansz raised but did not 
press this position.38 Of course, this argument may ultimately have 
                                                  
34   Some commentators recommend that the focus be placed almost exclusively on the 
process by which the contract was formed. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 3. For details 
regarding the unconscionability doctrine, see generally Rick Bigwood, “Antipodean Re-
flections on the Canadian Unconscionability Doctrine” (2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 171. 
35   Berry, supra note 5 at para. 49. 
36   See M.J. Trebilcock, “The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite 
Economics in the House of Lords” (1976) 26 U.T.L.J. 359. 
37   Ibid. 
38   See Birch, supra note 1 at paras. 80-81. I argue that Juriansz J.A. did not press the is-
sue because he conceded that it followed from prospective members’ inability to negoti-
ate that there was an inequality of bargaining power (ibid.). 
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proven to be ill-founded; it may have been unreasonable to expect the ap-
plicants to stay out of the union. But for the sake of clarifying the law, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal should have indicated that it was worth examin-
ing the applicants’ opportunities to avoid signing the contract.  
 Other features of the contracting process also warrant attention in de-
termining procedural unconscionability. In particular, in deciding 
whether to enforce an onerous contractual provision, it seems important 
to consider whether and to what extent the disadvantaged party was in-
formed of its existence and significance. Whether onerous terms were bur-
ied in the fine print of a lengthy agreement (as opposed to highlighted in 
bold font, marked with a big red arrow, and accompanied by an oral warn-
ing), and whether the parties were likely to be familiar with the terms in 
question by virtue of their past experience, are typically highly relevant in 
determining whether a contract is tainted by unconscionability.39 Yet 
none of the opinions in Birch address these topics.  
III.  Should the Court’s Reasoning Be Taken at Face Value? 
 So far I have taken the Ontario Court of Appeal at face value when it 
stated that it would analyze the enforceability of the stipulated remedy 
provision through the lens of the generally applicable doctrine of uncon-
scionability. But this may be a misreading of their decision.40 Perhaps the 
members of the majority felt obliged to pay lip service to the new ap-
proach to stipulated remedies but remained sympathetic to the traditional 
penalty doctrine and its bright-line clarity. Or perhaps they concluded 
that the unconscionability doctrine has some merit but that the nuanced 
analysis applied in other unconscionability cases was inappropriate for a 
case involving stipulated remedies in a contract of adhesion. Finally, per-
haps the court was moved by considerations specific to the labour law con-
text. These might include unstated factual assumptions about the circum-
stances of unions and their members, or a lingering reluctance to have the 
relationship between unions and their members defined by courts as op-
posed to either the legislature or the parties’ arrangements. I am inclined 
to take the majority’s opinion at face value. However, if I am wrong and 
these sorts of unarticulated considerations did influence their ruling, then 
the majority in the Ontario Court of Appeal missed more opportunities to 
clarify the law than I suggest above.   
                                                  
39   See e.g. Calloway Reit (Westgate) v. Michaels of Canada, 2009 CanLII 7760 at para. 97 
(Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (no inequality of bargaining power where disadvantaged party was a 
sophisticated commercial developer familiar with penalty clauses and represented by a 
sophisticated leasing agent), aff’d on other grounds 2009 ONCA 713. 
40   I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for encouraging me to address these alterna-
tive interpretations. 
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Conclusion 
 By this point, my central concern about the majority opinion in Birch 
should be clear: the opinion misses several opportunities to examine fea-
tures of the case that would have been ignored under the penalty doctrine 
but ought to have been prominent once the issue in the case was framed 
in terms of unconscionability. Those features include: other provisions of 
the contract; the relative difficulty of arriving at a genuine pre-estimate of 
the loss as opposed to a reasonable penalty; and the process by which the 
contract was formed. By failing either to examine those features of the 
case or to explain why they could be safely ignored, the court missed an 
opportunity to clarify the law. 
 Employing the unconscionability doctrine instead of the traditional 
penalty doctrine was a bold and valuable step. But the potential benefits 
of that innovation will not be realized so long as courts’ vision continues to 
be occluded by the remnants of the penalty doctrine. 
    
